Abstract

This paper rationalizes the major pressures on Pakistani nuclear program in a regional perspective and explores the sufficiency of various solutions that Pakistan can adopt to cope with them. The paper argues that though Pakistan reluctantly entered the nuclear race compelled by India, the club of early nuclear powers does not recognize this compulsion. The pressures on Pakistan are multifarious: sanctions on acquisition of arms, aid, and engaging in economic activities and overt/covert diplomacy (ranging from persuasion to intimidation and isolation). The paper finds that for Pakistan, besides nuclear arms, the main issues are her statehood, security, and development. The paper recommends that future demographic developments and finding a solution to the economic woes would help Pakistan in making its nuclear programme safe. The change in global perception about Pakistan’s economic and security needs would help in achieving this aim.

Key Words

Nuclear Security, Diplomacy, Strategic, Pakistan, South Asia, Development, Nuclear Arms

Introduction

In a regional perspective, all state events are assessed on the basis of past events, actions of the present and prospects for a future. Diplomacy is neither cricket to hit every ball you are facing according to your plans, nor iis it hockey where you are supposed to beat the judgment of opponent players, but it is an act of an acrobat who has jumped in the air and is falling towards a rope or a pole to catch it. Before making a judgment to catch balance back from a freefall situation no spectator can guess well if this is a day when our acrobat will misjudge and will die in a freefall to the hard ground, mere fractions of seconds even before crossing the point decidings all outcome or a safety net underneath can work as last resort. As Henry Kissinger stated about diplomacy, "It also enables a state to act purposefully in the face of the challenges confronting its security (Kissinger, 1957)

The answer for various people will be according to their understanding of issues and how they link or delink these events. We are sure some smart Pakistani diplomats are looking these events from very different angles than seen within the world. They are calculating things keenly and can be thinking that a successful US-North Korean deal will bring more bad news for them comparing any other nation in the world as they know well they are economically weakest state on Nuclear Club. They are not officially recognized by major powers who only keeping this club as it was before the origination of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The journey of Pakistani Nuclear programme is the very interesting cause of her weak economic conditions since ever. Pakistani governments and diplomats for a long time have fallen into an acerbated position and looked for the right time to catch back their balance, while many in the world threaten them with a pullback of the final safety net.  

This paper looks into some historical developments that led Pakistan during her journey on accruing nuclear bomb. Further, it makes an analysis of current situations faced by Pakistan as a nuclear state and tries to cross into imaginary future prospects for Pakistan while dealing with world on nuclear issues. The paper discusses and conclude that how past, present and future strategic diplomatic options can secure Pakistani position on nuclear security and strategy in a better way.

Research Questions and Approach

The main objective of this paper is to focus on developing an understanding about motives behind Pakistani nuclear programme, and to assess the major stresses and strains which can make it vulnerable towards an abuse. Further, the paper explains that how a big power like US can develop better understanding of issues related to nuclear program of Pakistan. The main question this paper addresses is that what are the major pressures related to Pakistani Nuclear programme. This question presents further subsidiary questions i.e. what led Pakistan to develop of nuclear weapons? And what diplomatic options Pakistan has to protect her nuclear programme?

To investigate these questions, qualitative approach based on review of secondary data with focus on historical analysis has been adopted. First, the historical perspective is used to understand the factors that were responsible for Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear programme and then to understand various pressures once Pakistan achieved nuclear capability. The Scenario-Building Method (SBM) proposed by Moniz (2006) has been used as a theoretical framework. The SBM project the future developments related to the nuclear program and efficacy of different available option for dealing with future of the program. SBM rationalise a problem as a scenario and then juxtapose other options as alternative scenarios. It allows for comparison and selection of the best case scenario through certain steps. These steps include, (a) recognition of the core issue/decision/option as a hypothetical scenario, (b) simplifying it by focusing only the key aspects and forces, (c) prioritizing/ordering the options moving from the most productive/vital to the least one, (d) integrating all options into a general scenario and finally (e) marking/labelling the significant stages for monitoring outcome for future (Moniz, 2006). 

Literature Review

First, mutual rivalries and competition affect these states’ international diplomatic positions on nuclear issues, and second, the action-reaction process introduces military capabilities and doctrines in the region that undermine the objectives held by the existing nuclear order will be examined. Third, the space for introducing arms control measures, however small, is reduced (Dalton, 2016).

 Pakistan emerged on the map of sub-continent as a new Muslim state on 14th August 1947, her early governments till middle regimes all were heavily loaded with concerns and issues of national security due to its rival neighbouring states of Afghanistan and India. Following this threat, Pakistani policy always remained focussed on self-defence and territorial integration. On the international level, even the major powers were more favourable towards India as compared to Pakistan. For example, during Kennedy government, in a visit to India, his voice Lynden B Johnson encouraged Nehru to "extend his leadership to other areas in South Asia". While Ayub Khan, the President of Pakistan in his state visit to the US warned that, “If India become too powerful, her smaller Asian neighbours would have to seek China’s protection and that China would respond favourably to such a move." (Pande, 2011) A State Department documents on "Pakistan and the Non- Proliferation Issue," dated January 22, 1975 reveals clearly about Pakistan's efforts to seek nuclear weapon after Indian did exploded their test named "Smiling Buddha" by calling it peaceful. Document further shares concerns and assumption that, “India's test gave Pakistan the incentive to produce a nuclear weapon, and that it could do so with less world condemnation than might otherwise be expected." (Battle, 1975)

It is clear that India dragged Pakistan into nuclear arms race. Chakma (2012) is of the opinion that "Before 1960s Pakistan's attitude towards various global arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation instrument was positive and its policy towards them was primarily determined by the moral considerations." It is stated by Michael Krepon that, "Confusion on international checkerboard as one side USA is looming towards India due to financial and strategic gains and already into nuclear venture for peaceful use, while China and Pakistan are taken into axis, another hand it is being written that China and India even can go into more nuclear cooperation. “A serious competition between two nuclear-armed rivals is very hard to stabilize. When one rival increases its nuclear capability, the other does, too." (Chakma, 2012)

As soon as Soviet forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan Pakistan was put on sanction by USA using Pressler amendment.  This embargo strained Pakistani economy yet it never stopped its nuclear ambitions and kept the nuclear developments on scale. President Bill Clinton during his brief visit to Islamabad again repeated his government's concerns over democracy and nuclear issues. But all of this was soon going to end when Americans experience 9/11 brutal attack on her soil in decades and it decided to peruse against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and circumstance put Pakistan again into seat of favourable ally in the area. 

The Obama administration again started negotiations with Pakistan on its nuclear weapons, further many events like killing of OBL in Pakistan, the Salala based incident that killed many Pakistani soldiers by USA forces and brought strains in relations of two countries and nuclear issue always was on table of discussion, its bitterness was felt soon after the US claimed to intercept a ship in the Arabian Sea that was allegedly taking nuclear equipment from Pakistan to Libya. Libya provided USA with various documents and information upon which Pakistan have to dismantle AQ Khan network blamed for doing all these sales of nuclear equipment without in notice of government in Islamabad. 

President Donald Trump in his speech made very clear his commitment towards non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Further, he also blamed Pakistan for its double game inside Afghanistan and supporting aid to Haqqanies, though Pakistan officially denies such allegations. This also gave Pakistanis a say to mention that world is not doing more regarding her role in war on terror and her economic losses are far greater than financial payments by NATO and allies to compensate her services and support on the war against terrorism. Over the time various US diplomats, senators, CIA officials been blaming Pakistan for various things including nuclear proliferation. Similarly, Edward Snowdon revealed in one documentary to channel four in the UK that USA is spying on Pakistan's electronic communication in-volume than she is doing within its own country through NSA. Indians on another hand not only blame Pakistan for proxies and terrorism like Mumbai attacks on its soil but also propagate vulnerability of Pakistani Nuclear weapons. Many in Washington look earring toward such lobbying and propaganda as same resounds in US Senate and house committees many times. 

On May 18, 1974, India tested their first nuclear bomb in an operation code-named Smiling Buddha. Soon, Bhutto was removed by the Military government of Zia and USA again tried to convince Zia on freezing its efforts on nuclear weapons. Initially, Pakistan showed a mixed response and it was in view of that a breakthrough can be made but new developments in Afghanistan diverted world focus from Pakistan's nuclear developments toward Afghanistan. Pakistan took the opportunity for granted and exploited it well by achieving a breakthrough in 1983 later it said to possess 5 to 7 nuclear bomb till 1987. Though later it declared its capacity as made tests in the area of Chagi, Baluchistan in 1998. According to Faisal, (2016) "With these tests, the era of a covert military?nuclear program and a policy of ‘deliberate nuclear ambiguity’ came to an end. 

Strategic and Nuclear diplomacy

Pakistan since the start was a supporter of disarmament, yet events in 1948 with its brief war on Kashmir and later 1965 war changed Pakistani vision and they start looking to acquire more sophisticated weapons. When Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was introduced in 1968 Pakistan refused to rectify it before India will do so. This and later Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) failed to convince country. India later announced its nuclear policy and pretending that its whole nuclear progress is peaceful, while the same stance was adopted by India at time of its first nuclear test in 1974 and also named it "Smiling Buddha" which itself seems questionable to name a deadly bomb like atomic bomb with Bhudha who was preacher of complete non-violence, hence Indian programme never can be called as peaceful.  As Arnett, (1996) stated, "Pakistan crossed Rubicon in 1987 enriching Uranium by 95% thresh hold."

After Indian's nuclear venture Pakistan started her struggle on acquiring its nuclear weapons and tested six bombs in 1998. While world trying to stop more nations to acquire a nuclear bomb and this led to serious sanctions on Iran, North Korea, others different countries by world capitals including the USA. A question was raised by George Perkovich and Tony Dalton in their book, "But since outright peacemaking seems similarly infeasible, what combination of coercive pressure and bargaining could lead to peace?" (Perkovich, 2016)

As Pakistan already joined nuclear club and is rapidly bringing advancements in its nuclear capability.  "The existing order primarily benefits states that developed nuclear technology earliest and wrote most of the rules governing international nuclear affairs. Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Pakistan are five states that in different ways occupy this uncomfortable middle ground." (Perkovich, 2016)  Pakistani diplomats surely realize that have all advantages comparing any of these states but they also know they have to make Pakistan secure related to its strategic nuclear policy and strategic diplomacy. There are various aspects of such diplomacy which Pakistan need to highlight to the world when engaging in any strategic dialogue with India, Russia, China or USA.  As strategic negotiations or talks are unlike just throwing message and accepting it, these are more than smiles, handshakes, (hugs as in Modi gesture) photo sessions, joint communiqués, one has to take everything undone unless signatures are confirmed and some practical actions follow by.

Currently, Pakistan has followed a strategic missile capacity as shown in the table.

Table – Pakistan’s Strategic Missile Capacity

NASR/ Hatf?IX 60 km shorter ranges conventional and nuclear warheads

Abdali/Hatf?2 180km  varied manoeuvrability

Ghaznavi/Hatf?III 350 km short?range surface to surface ballistic missile conventional and nuclear warheads

Babur/Hatf?VII 700km sub?sonic land?attack weapon conventional and

nuclear warheads

Ra’ad/ Hatf?VIII stealth

Shaheen?I/Hatf?IV 700kms conventional

Ghauri Missile System/Hatf?V 1300kms  nuclear/conventional

Shaheen?II/Hatf?VI 1600-2000 km conventional

Shaheen?III 2750km conventional

 Source: Faisal 2016

With around 100 warheads and capability regarding small arms according some news reports makes Pakistan in a better position to negotiate its strategic security and economic needs than any world player or regional power, if our diplomats who are very much capable to negotiate with clear minds and speak from equality that is very essence of real diplomacy.

Afghan wars every time proved a relief time for Pakistan regarding her nuclear developments, for example, one can estimate where Pakistani nuclear programme would have been if America was not diverted and seeking Pakistani support against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and in the 1980s and later against Al-Qaeda and Taliban in 2001. Recent developments in Afghanistan that started the 4th battle there, Indian proxies in the west using Afghanistan and Iran territory, and economic meltdown faced by Pakistan due to growing foreign debts are demanding new approach both by Pakistan and world on the nuclear security and diplomacy. Various aspects are developing growing stress on the country in coming times issues like continuous hot borders and internal conflicts, internal socio-politico pressures, youth bulge in the age of technology and possible impacts of successful US-North Korea negotiation. As being economically weaker among nuclear club sates, Pakistan can be seen as next topic in world media. Yet, it seems that Pakistan can easily sustain all type of worst pressures related to nuclear or economic, diplomatic situations and deadlocks if it successfully places efficient negotiation makers and clever deal brokers within its foreign offices.  Though she already has a good track on securing its nuclear progress, now when she already standing inside the club of nuclear elite there is less pressure but possibly long-term negotiations ahead to gain maximum from any development. Next question for the world would be how to support and strengthen Pakistan economically instead trying otherwise option which according to past history will never work for any negotiation with Pakistan.  Here we find what kind of scenarios world facing regarding nuclear security and strategic developments related to Pakistan.  

Scenarios

"After the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in the summer of 1998, the world first demanded that Delhi and Islamabad roll back their nuclear and missile programmes. But soon enough it was clear that the international community had to live with a nuclear South Asia."  (Mohan, 2018) 

Pakistan, according to the world, remained the epicenter of nuclear proliferation since the 1990s while it is linked to made exchanges with various countries on nuclear supplies. Later in 2008 USA unearthed the AQ Khan network which according to them was delivering Libya with centrifuges. Further somehow Pakistan is also blamed for her cooperation on nuclear technology with North Korea. Though Pakistan denies such especially it set new command and control after AQ Khan issues were known. 

There is greater Indian propaganda which unfortunately well taken and brought inside Washington that Pakistani weapon can fell into hands of terrorists. Though many studies were done by Pakistani experts, American, Indians and other negate such perception and no serious evidence lead towards such conclusion yet Pakistan diplomacy have to attend this question again and again. Pakistan over years not only have cooperated within its nuclear framework to assure world community on safety and security of its nuclear programme but there is a lot to do make her listened to others. There is need to explain the world that squeezing Pakistan and putting sanctions of some kind will never help world community to gain what they demand from Pakistan but it can bring opposite results. "Pakistan itself is unlikely to make unilateral moves to change the status quo, due to the existing regional security environment and the unresponsive posture of its principal rival, India." (Reif, 2018)  

Another famous interpretation on the threat from Pakistani nuclear weapon is its accidental use by an emotional commander or so. It is fact that in case of nuclear accidents impacts are always devastating but in this case, this is weakest of all arguments, cause Pakistani nuclear weapon have similar chances of hitting an accident as weapons piles in USA, Russia, UK, France, China, and India or Israel. This point is not that much of academic discussion but surely it is good for a novel or fantasy thinking.  

Pakistan can use a small nuclear weapon in wake of any war with India, this is another argument and fear which is shared by many American strategists, But the fact is what we do when we find a certain and real-time danger? We normally bring an immediate remedy for this, in case of India and Pakistan, there are 90% greater chance for a war on Kashmir than any other flash point like water resources, border areas or other. If strategic experts in the western world were thinking this point seriously they were never waiting for India and Pakistan to strike a bilateral deal on Kashmir but were actively involved and already have brought both on finding a deal on Kashmir. The absence of such keenness from any quarter of world reflects the seriousness of such nuclear war between two nuclear states. 

Pakistan has established double security measures on nuclear control involving security council which consist of military and responsible civilian government representatives and military top commanders who discuss many security issues regularly. If any country of the world interested seriously to prevent any nuclear confrontation between two states and want to help Pakistan they must strengthen democracy in Pakistan. Greater the democracy inside country more will be a genuine public representation and more public representation will lead to responsible decisions on defense and other strategic aspects. Further, the nuclear command and control system in Pakistan is performing smooth, secure and responsible since past four decades and bringing new questions about such well-performing command and control system will not be a good idea but only will show unjustified fears. 

Two Divergent Poles 

A 2015 report by two American scholars, Dalton and Krepon, entitled “Normal Nuclear Pakistan” expresses cynicism of Pakistan’s nuclear policies and suggests Pakistan would do best to cap its nuclear capabilities, and an article that was published in New York Times this year, called for the world to “secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.” (George Perkovich, 2016)

Pakistan is sitting in a very important geostrategic location, this unique location makes a country very important player in peace and security in this region. Indian forces enter into Kashmir violating standstill agreement from Raja of Kashmir that initially provided guaranteed to both states about its decision on position to be an independent state or one which will join either of any two states. In presence of UNO resolutions, India failed to play according to rules and later denied UN medication on the issue by declaring it a bilateral issue. Pakistan as a state within global state community find it difficult to get a fair deal from India and due to Indian weight in global politics was failed win third-party support on the issue of Kashmir, which still even today poses a serious threat to regional security and continuous cross-border firing makes it more complex and flashpoint between two nuclear powers.   

 After Pakistan and India officially declared their atomic war capacity by detonating bombs in May 1998 there were some voices assuring technically that now the chances of conventional war between two rival states are gone to a minimum. But this myth can fall to prove wrong anytime as it brought a new phenomenon between two states that even a clash on borders will never escalate to certain levels and will be mediated by many powers due to fear of nuclear use. Unfortunately, this nuclear deterrence brought more insecurity in the region. Indian accusation about proxy by Pakistan inside Kashmir now coming to a level as Pakistan captured Kalbhushan Yadav and Indian serving military commander who was involved in terrorism inside Karachi (Kamrah air base) Baluchistan. This revelations from Kalbhushan are sufficient for Pakistan to put her case before international powers, pressures and regarding Indian behavior towards destabilizing Pakistan. Pakistan which already is engaged in battles from time to time on its western borders cannot afford such Indian proxy within its other regions and this phenomenon if not taken seriously on a global level can lead to unwanted disasters.  Pakistan is keen to keep its deterrence against India and this was repeatedly expressed by each and every Pakistani governments as an editorial in Dawn (2003) shared same with reference to President Musharraf, " Press statements of the NCA in 2002, 2003 and 2004 emphasized development of nuclear forces as per “minimum deterrence needs”. 

 Pakistan Military for sure will not cross borders and attack Indians within Indian territory, in such scenario an Indian proxy is doing nothing but putting extra pressure on Pakistan military which is already dealing critical security of nuclear arms along with many other strains.  

Pakistan is blamed for playing double games on the various issues and many books written by popular American strategic writers, senators in their statement within senate committees in US Senate, and critics who were making comments about Pakistani behavior on various events. Some were happy to title Pakistan rouge state, failed state, or labeled its nuclear arms very easy to get stole by terrorists. Luckily nothing serious came into reality which is always resounded from Washington and other capitals of the world. Indian lobby is powerful as its resourceful better way comparing Pakistani lobby in world capitals. Yet over years Pakistan successfully proved that its nuclear security is as better as of any other nuclear power in our world. Critical analysis of her nuclear security gives Pakistan all positives as she managing well while being in all strains, pressures, and threats related her nuclear arms. The only thing which can suddenly change things towards positive especially from world perspectives is bridging the trust deficit towards Pakistan. Let's assume it is Pakistani diplomatic failure to win credible trust yet as it's about nuclear arms we can easily blame the world for being at same trust deficit from a Pakistani perspective. Pakistan publically denied its nuclear weapon pursuit for years but been progressing rapidly on it.  

Now the situations for Pakistan are not ideal, its economic pressures, continuous unrest in many areas including Afghan borders and Indian borders, lack of sufficient resources to utilize its youth bulge and growing foreign debts. If some follow various US Senate proceedings which discussing Pakistan Nuclear issues. We can easily identify a feeling or thought among American Senators (many of them) that If Pakistan comes to a point of bankruptcy then it may become easy only then to make a breakthrough bargain on rolling back of her nuclear capability. Yet, all track records related to Pakistan's nuclear programme are bluntly pointing towards something different. After keenly studying through Pakistan's nuclear progress under various military, civilian, strong or weak governments it will be a bold and risky thought that if Pakistan goes on verge of financial bankruptcy she will surrender her nuclear arms to world or will open its labs doors to IAEA, but it can lead to some different scenario. Recent economic growth within Africa and South America leading towards freedom of these states to go and buy some sophisticated weapons from anywhere they can find to boost their national security. Incoming five to ten years depending on situation and failure or success of projects like global zero or events like NPT, CTBT, and international organisation question appears what world can do to stop Pakistan from searching economic  options to avoid a bankruptcy and will that be a consideration there among Pakistani state institution on selling its technology instead surrendering it to gain economic relief. Question is very easy to answer, either ask an American student or economics, strategic studies or an expert that what they will choose for their country if come across such choices in future. Though we can also trace answers in past behaviors of USA, Russia, France, and China to find how states behave regarding their nuclear skills when they need to generate economic benefits from this. Will Pakistan better to beg from the word for economic gains in presence of a 21st-century youth which demands equality in every sphere of life or they will be easy to pressure and make to table results on nuclear capacity that was never achieved by world powers before in their efforts since the late 1970s. Only it's to the world to decide how they want to treat Pakistan, as Pakistan already have shown how she can make choices when they come across. 

Remedies for Nuclear International Concerns

Mr. Abdul Sattar, Pakistani foreign minister stated in a conference in Islamabad, (1999), "However, at the same time they also emphasized that “nuclear weapons are not meant for war?fighting. Nuclear deterrence, unlike the conventional one, is not degraded by the quantitative or qualitative disparity.” 

In June 2001, addressing the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington, D.C, Mr. Abdul Sattar firmly stated that the government had embraced “minimum credible deterrence as the guide to [its] nuclear program”.

In addition, Pakistan adheres to several international resolutions aimed at prevention of nuclear terrorism and proliferation of nuclear material to non-state actors, such as UNSC Resolution 1540, (aimed at the prevention of transfer or assistance to produce nuclear weapons); Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and Container Security Initiative (CSI), all of which require states to put mechanisms into place to prevent nuclear proliferation (Wilmshurst, 2004).

First it is about economy of Pakistan and this fact must not only to be understood by Pakistan itself but rest of world must also understand that economic leverage not only helps in managing strategic resources and efficient performance but also required from all international organisations to make it sure that more support for Pakistani economy will lead to resolution of Nuclear proliferation, any accidental use or other concerns which they have towards Pakistani Nuclear Stockpile. A sound economy will build confidence in Pakistani government to decrease its strategic dependence on Nuclear Weapons.  Weaker Pakistani economy will surely make Pakistan look for options not only to secure her nuclear weapons but also making some money from it. 

Secondly, there is serious trust deficit and the positional gap between major actors in the region especially between India and Pakistan, USA and Pakistan and even between India and USA. On one hand India declared her policy of No-first Use but the USA and other World players do not trust this declaration especially after BJP's Modi government which on one hand celebrating shining India for its economic growth but on other hand extremists Hindu groups which have greater influence over Modi government not only killing minorities in India but also in favour of use of nuclear arms against Pakistan. All parties interested for Nuclear safety in must not only realize Pakistani serious concerns related her defense against India but also put positive direction in the resolution of Kashmir which since past 70 years is major flash point and contention between two states of Pakistan and India. Without the USA and other mediatory powers intervention, Pakistan and India can never resolve Kashmir as both are not ready to make any compromise over their claims and position on the issue. Pakistan also looks issue of Kashmir more seriously due to its dependence on Indus waters and other rivers flowing from Kashmir to Pakistan. 

Thirdly, Pakistan is not easy with its strategic partnership with many other nations, where its medium power status is not considered rightfully especially when Pakistan already possess reasonable military and nuclear capacity. India though claims to have No-First use policy as stated by Faisal, (2016), "Given India’s conventional military superiority, Pakistan does not subscribe to the policy of No-First-Use." but for Pakistan, this means no sufficient guarantee for her security. On another hand, there is right way and time to ease a populous concept within Pakistani masses that their country is being denied for a fair nuclear role within world especially related her rights toward the peaceful use of nuclear technology by restricting her access to such technology. Recent Indian-USA agreement on nuclear support added to this perception. 

Conclusion

Drawing on the history of conflict between India and Pakistan, in his book Yusuf describes the potential for third-party intervention to avert nuclear war. His book lays out the ways regional powers behave and maneuver in response to the pressures of strong global powers (Yusuf, 2018) .

 For Pakistan, it is primarily not about nuclear arms but her main issues are related to her statehood, security, and development. For successive military and civilian governments, all strategies adopted by the world cannot ensure confidence to adjust, roll-back or freeze her nuclear arms developments.  Same would be standing for coming government after elections this year. For the majority of decision makers in Islamabad every front door, open door, close door, backdoor diplomacy, any pressure, the policy of carrot and stick is part of the situation and they now are much experienced in handling such. The confidence of diplomats is better than it used to be in the 70s, 80s, and 90s, hence they know well how to manage any situation even immense pressures like one surfaced immediately after 9/11.  

The Indo?US agreement envisaged nuclear and ballistic missile defense cooperation. Pakistan’s concerns were elaborated in 2006 NCA press statement, stating, “India?US agreement would enable India to produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from un-safeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve that our credible minimum deterrence requirements will be met.” (Spacewar, 2006)

Now the time has come when the world must realize that major issue related Pakistan's major issue what so ever would have to resolve it considering the case of Pakistan and it will be a nerve breaking for a world more it will delay or reject understanding on Pakistan's genuine and strong viewpoint.  As it is said sooner is better,  more delays more complexity will lead Pakistan to come under continues pressure and threats, lead world towards complex, dangerous security feelings as many other states also on this journey of acquiring nuclear capabilities for military purposes.  Tony Dalton has a view that "Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Pakistan all possess advanced nuclear technology as of 2016, but to varying degrees all faced efforts by other states or regimes to deny or withhold such technology in the past." 

Global village in next 15 years or so impact will seize to be local but a global. jobless, hungry youth when will shout a course it will just not heard in one street or building but will resound around the globe with a low or high pitch that may be more dangerous than nuclear proliferation. The new generation in Pakistan sitting in high-class offices, using luxury cars, enjoying the beauty of north, understanding from internet Knowledge pool is different in behavior from weaker positions of the all past decades.

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