Abstract

The purpose of this research study was to critically analyze the plans of China to develop its economy by connecting itself with the rest of the world through roads network. For this purpose, qualitative research was adopted in which secondary sources were taken. The literature available was thoroughly reviewed, and an interpretive analysis technique was used to analyze and reach a conclusion. The study has concluded that the economic corridor of Central and West Asia has to face a multitude of problems, but these regions are also replete with natural resources. The challenges like infrastructure development and lack of funds could hamper local growth. The study observes that the CCWAEC will promote economic and commercial collaboration and capital flows to these regions and improve regional economic and social development.

Key Words

Rise of China, Interpretivist Approach, Corridors, and Critical Analysis

Introduction

It is an admitted fact that developing countries of the world are becoming a significant source of Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI), and globally those firms which are highly successful in the world are a well-known fact (Kim and Park 2015). For example, China has become the world's fastest-growing economy in the last 20 years (Paul 2015). It is also a reality that the economy of China has been acknowledged as the largest economy in Asia, the Chinese economy has grown in a very rapid fashion, and spectacular exports have aided it to emerge into a global force, drawing special courtesy from the global public (Paul and Mas 2016). China's enormous dragon economy has prospered in various industries, from textiles to rising technology. China's growing role in international trade cleverly alters the global supply and request dynamic for manufactured commodities, primary materials, and services. (Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci 2008).

Proponents of the northern corridor land bridge design clearly understand the Project's vast issues, but the impediments can be overcome. Test runs of block trains are currently being undertaken. Is this confidence warranted? The sheer scale of the potential demand makes the land bridge a very appealing prospect. The performance of the North American Rail Land Bridge is seen as evidence of the promise of intermodal rail transport. However, it is claimed in this section that the advocates are too optimistic, tending to skip over specific fundamental problems and ignoring minor issues.

The fundamental gap in track gauges between Russia, Belarus, Mongolia, and the other national rail systems is a significant technical issue. As the TSR is used for all the new possible northern corridors, a transition is required between the TSR broad gauge and the standard gauge elsewhere. Thus, a container transported from Western Europe would have to be moved to a broad gauge freight vehicle at the Polish border and would have to be returned to a standard gauge wagon at the Chinese border if it were not shipped to a Russian Pacific coast port. Several ESCAP technical studies say that there are ways to efficiently carry out transfers, using conventional container lift gear most economically. Still, potential systems could use wagons capable of switching bogies of various gauges. As long as the land bridge's time and distance advantages are apparent, the cost is crucial.

It is doubtful that the land bridge will capture traffic unless the rail corridors can compete with all-sea routes by providing reasonable rates. Although ESCAP studies indicate that the rail corridor could provide up to 30 percent for shipments between Poland and Korea, there are many advantages for most major markets in Western Europe. It is shown that the southern route is not cost-competitive with ocean transport. Since there are no connections at present, there are many operational problems in implementing the corridors. As a possible bottleneck, customs clearance and border controls are used.

The lack of data access and sharing of information between the operating systems is another concern. The national rail networks are desperately calling for solutions to these problems. ESCAP, for example, is pursuing the introduction of international container clearance agreements and has proposed that a standard EDI system be adopted for use by the railway industry. (Slack, B. 2000.p.7)

It is now claimed that the People's Republic of China (PRC) has developed Asia's most potent regime. Its popularity is primarily attributed to its rapid and continuing economic growth rate over the past 30 years (cf. Keller and Rawski 2007). Reports predict that China and a few other developing countries will be much greater globally in 2030. This would alter the global pattern of international affairs to bring about a new balance of power, making international security more complex than ever. (Phillips 2008). The question is whether a danger to neighboring states is the successful economic growth that makes China potentially the most powerful nation in the region. Instead, if China's declared policy of economically and politically supporting itself as a "peacefully growing nation" would be embraced by others (Noble 2008). Other people's views of a nation's extent of danger are assumed to play a significant role in influencing foreign affairs. Before the 21st century, onlookers in foreign affairs, with the focus on American unit-polarity, were not aware of how China could rise in the future.

China's increase to prominence in the global community began in 1978 with a sequence of financial developments aimed at modernizing the republic. As a result, Beijing needed to connect itself with the international financial institutions led by America. As a result, China's policy has considerably strengthened its position in the global political system over the last four decades by adapting to the prevalent standard of Western capitalism trade or adjusting to the prevailing standard of Western capitalist exchange.

However, critics of China argue that it is a pragmatic force that will drastically alter the dynamics of world affairs as its economic expansion propels it to hegemony. Authors' concerns on this side of the argument range from generalizations founded on China's communist leadership to more thoughtful doubts of countless power confrontations stemming from China's behavior resulting from the Western Financial Crisis.

Authors counter the conclusions of the "China threat theory" by influencing past and planned examination of China's association with the global scheme. Through its acquired economic power, China's plan has improved its role in the international system over the four historical periods. Nowadays, universal acceptance by nearly all customers of the famous slogan, "Made in China," says to China's swelling attendance in the world. As a result, the appearance of China as a countless control within the global scheme has gained momentum.

Economic globalization and national improvements have propelled China on a path typified by yearly development charges ranging from 8% to 10%. Annual foreign direct asset inflows of $35-50 billion ended the previous two decades. This transformation in China's economic stature has far-reaching ramifications for the global economy. Yet, China, emancipated by and exposed to the force of economic globalization, is often assumed to be preliminary from cutting and developing something fundamentally original for himself, Asia, and maybe the whole domain. Similarly, it was also noted by McGregor (2006) that media also claims that China's monetary expansion is causing a significant divergence in global marketplaces.




Statement of the Problem

There are several studies on China. Numerous analysts and scholars have highlighted the importance of China, its policies, and its projects. In addition, several other studies with a prism of Japan, America, and Europe have been addressed. It is interesting to note that some of Asia's rising powers, such as Russia, India, and Japan, have also been discussed while talking about China's rise as some of the studies have been conducted to understand how Japan is accommodating China's rise, how China's watchers are looking at the US while discussing China's rise, and how India and Japan are responding in the region (Mochizuki, M. M. 2007; Chung, 2007; H. 2009; Art, R. J. 2010; 2010; Kirshner, J. 2012; Lee, P. S. 2012; Bardhan, 2012; And Christiansen, T., & Maher, R., 2016; and Year 2017). However, from the perspective of Power Transition Theory, this study has attempted to examine one of the critical factors in the rise of China in Asia. This aspect of the rise of China in Asia was previously underexplored by various academics in Pakistan. 




Research Objective

To analyze how Corridor of Connectivity could contribute to shaping the rise of China in Asia




Research Question

How could Corridor of Connectivity contribute to shaping China's rise in Asia?

Research Methodology

The researcher uses qualitative methodologies in this study, with an interpretative approach to research analysis. Hence, its purpose was to explain the understudied phenomenon to understand the topic under consideration better. This reflects that the researcher will analyze the matter in the natural setting researchers analyze things, with the purpose to make sense of the things, or perceive, and also to explain the occurrence of the things in a natural setting to make the readers understand what was going on and what is its meaning in the context. In addition to this, this research applies secondary sources of data. It relies on the national archives, databases, articles, newspapers, magazines, and books.

Discussion

In this discussion part, we critically examine the role of economic corridors in the rise of China in Asia. It also discusses the positive and negative aspects of these corridors for rising China. Therefore, each corridor is separately explained in order to understand whether these corridors could help contribute to the shaping of China's rise in Asia or is it still a distant dream for Beijing to achieve its set goals. Moreover, there are six corridors of connectivity in Asia China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, New Eurasia Land Bridge, and China- Central Asia-West Asia Corridor. Each one of these corridors is analyzed and interpreted in this section.

China-Pakistan-Economic Corridor

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is a massive project aiming at changing the geo-economic dynamics of Pakistan-China relations and boosting regional trade. It anticipates, among other things, economic growth, addressing energy shortages, job creation, attracting foreign direct investment, building infrastructure, and increasing tourism. The multibillion-dollar project is a long-term investment in Pakistan that includes countries in the region. Beijing has described the corridor linking China and Pakistan as "the fastest and most efficient" of the BRI projects. In both Beijing and Islamabad, the expectation is that infrastructure spending would reinforce the relations between the two countries in economic and political terms.

Through Pakistan's underfunded substructure, it's informal to understand why Islamabad would be enticed to large-scale Chinese assets. Up to USD 62 billion will be consumed in this strip, with USD 12.4 billion previously capitalized in control subsidized up to 2019. With this huge investment, China will have a direct approach or contact with the Arabian countries, which will boost its sale and China will consider their market the green market where everything is sold. And alignment of Gwadar Harbor will be bringing a twist in the main port of South Asia, which will ultimately support China in improving or having better business with the Arabian countries but may be affecting the other nations of the world (Ranjan, A. 2015).

China find it its products to the rising of Pakistan. The presence, however, established challenging barriers in the BRI's concern the corridor passes Kashmir's territories officially, the BRI's until it addresses its geopolitical concerns. The China-Pakistan Corridor network has four communities with modularity of 0.37: three Chinese communities and one community with cities located in Pakistan. (Meo, et al., 2018). 

In an attempt to escape scrutiny, Andrew Small (2015) thought that much of the agreements and collaboration were kept secret. He coined a phrase to describe the relationship, "Cooperation in Shadows." A close bond of confidence has formed between the two countries over the years. Confidence has always been a key component of close relations. China's foreign policy gives Pakistan a massive emphasis on China's future endeavors. One of the most famous examples is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The two governments have been working for a long time on the idea (almost two decades). (Small, A. 2015). 

The 2003 Joint Deceleration, following President Musharraf's visit, is the first document that details the two countries' future cooperation plans. Later, in 2006, the Free Trade Agreement was signed, helping to increase trade. Trade-in 2015 hit $15.15 billion, compared to $1 billion in 1998. (Sheikh al el., 2019).

 




Map on CPEC


The CPEC is not without obstacles, considering its strategic value to both China and Pakistan. It is surrounded by a slew of major threats, ranging from regional stability to political unrest in Pakistan's regions. The CPEC's main worry may be regional security since it passes through areas with the worst security threats. Each of these challenges are identified as under:
First the most serious challenge to the situation, particularly its spillover into Pakistan. China's regions are essential for China's massive investment in the region. (Small, 2015). As a result, China is vigorously attempting the inside arrangement, the United States. Second, long-running conflict in Baluchistan is expected to make the CPEC and related projects, such as the Port of Gwadar, more difficult to implement. Baluchistan's increasing insurgency poses a threat to both the CPEC and Pakistan's federation. It is critical for the CPEC's success that the Baloch people's issues are addressed, which might be accomplished through a well-thought-out approach of integrating the least integrated Baluchistan people into Pakistan's democratic process (Javed, 2021).
To express their dissatisfaction with the lack of CPEC-related agreements. However, the ministry in issue appears hesitant to make it public, raising more concerns about the Project's transparency. The Baluchistan Nationalist Parties have once again demanded the publishing of all agreements reached between China and Pakistan about the CPEC, as well as the protection of Baluchistan's rights (Dawn, 2016). If the problems of the smaller provinces and areas, including Gilgit-Baltistan, are not addressed timely through political consultation, there will always be political strife among the provinces of Punjab over the benefits of the CPEC.
However, the  opportunities it brings are enormous, including a boost in the economy, energy transformation, infrastructure development, job creation, regional connectivity, and so on. Furthermore, with these advantages, Pakistan and China will be able to gain the most out of this joint stride of the China-Pakistan economic corridor.

New Eurasian Land Bridge

Many academic scholars and strategic analysts have done studies on how New Eurasian Land Bridge is relevant to Chinese projects and how it could. In connection to this, Tenenbaum, J. (2001) looks at how infrastructure takes shape while talking about the new Eurasian land bridge. While Professor Shu, X (1997) focuses on the prospects of the Eurasian land bridge. Whereas experts like underscores the character of the European contribution or establishing the Economic Belt. (Tenenbaum, J. 2001; Shu, X. 1997, and Zuokui, L. 2014). One of the most ambitious OBOR initiatives is the New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor, which aims to improve rail connectivity Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus. The rail transportation.

The New Eurasian Land Bridge is one of China's OBOR Initiative's six main strips. It is often mentioned as a division or constituent Modern. The purpose of this scheme is to promote cross border rail system. It attaches great importance to Europe through the, which twigs, marks Kazakhstan's attaches net in Yekaterinburg, avoiding the trans-Siberian railway's southern leg in north-eastern China and avoiding the Russian railway net in Yekaterinburg. The routes the Malacca Strait, which is now congested. In Eurasia, a train line is in existence. The New Eurasian Land Bridge is comparatively good in contrast to Project. The rail substructure between Europe and China is previously of a high relevance; the Kazakhstan and Russian shares, on the other hand, are in frantic need of important assets. Kazakhstan, began a promotion work for 724 kilometers of the path along the New Silk Road line. Through the 2000s updating, it is smoothly supposed to be seeing a (Geopolitical Monitor January 20, 2018).

Proponents of the design of the northern corridor land bridge clearly understand the enormous issues facing the Project, but the impediments can be overcome. Test runs of block trains are currently being undertaken. Is this confidence warranted? The sheer scale of the potential demand makes the land bridge a very appealing prospect. The performance of the North American Rail Land Bridge is seen as evidence of the promise of intermodal rail transport. It is claimed in this section that the advocates are too optimistic, tending to skip over certain basic problems and ignoring minor problems.

The fundamental gap in track gauges between Russia, Belarus, Mongolia, and the other national rail systems is a big technical issue. As the TSR is used for all the new possible northern corridors, a transition is required between the TSR broad gauge and the standard gauge elsewhere. Thus, a container transported from Western Europe would have to be moved to a broad gauge freight vehicle at the Polish border and would have to be returned to a standard gauge wagon at the Chinese border if it were not shipped to a Russian Pacific coast port. Several ESCAP technical studies say that there are ways to efficiently carry out transfers, using conventional container lift gear most economically, but potential systems could use wagons capable of switching bogies of various gauges. As long as the land bridge's time and distance advantages are apparent, the cost is a crucial factor.

It is doubtful that the land bridge will capture traffic unless the rail corridors can compete with all-sea routes by providing reasonable rates. Although ESCAP studies indicate that the rail corridor could provide advantages of up to 30 percent for shipments between Poland and Korea, there are many advantages for most major markets in Western Europe. It is shown that the southern route is not cost-competitive with ocean transport. Since there are no connections at present, there are a significant number of operational problems in implementing the corridors. As a possible bottleneck, customs clearance and border controls are used.

The lack of data access and sharing of information between the operating systems is seen as another concern. The national rail networks are desperately calling for solutions to these problems. ESCAP, for example, is pursuing the introduction of international container clearance agreements and has proposed that a common EDI system be adopted for use by the railway industry. (Slack, B. 2000.p.7)

China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor

The main Mongolian portion of the Chinese BRI and promises to promote trade between Mongolia and its neighbors, as well as to give Mongolia access to overland routes to the European          Union and maritime ports in Asia. In 2019, Mongolia launched its first expressway. The milestone scheme was envisioned by China Tie Siju Civil Engineering Corporation, connecting Belt and Road to the Steppe Road Program of the republic. The expressway, which runs from projected flow as well as the local economy. The building of a railway is one of the highest-profile initiatives, significantly reducing the travel time between the countries. The building is predictable to be finished by the end of 2020. Mongolia hitherto big in comparative terms, but job amid China and Russia is cumulative fast skill contract could skill in the region. The main foundation.



MAPE ON CHINA – MONGOLIA –RUSSIA CORRIDOR

In spite of these improvements, there are certain challenges in running these corridors successfully. First, there are significant challenges in organizing interactions between stakeholders. Cooperation between the state, business structures, public and professional organizations, and other organizations within a single country is not always possible. This is much more difficult to achieve on a global scale. Furthermore, the three participating countries, Russia, Mongolia, and China differ greatly in terms of economic potential, state structure, development goals, and priorities. Interstate communication is difficult because the state's languages belong to different language classes. Second, addressing issues of interaction in a variety of fields ranging from transportation infrastructure to humanitarian cooperation. All of this complicates program implementation and necessitates the development of appropriate mechanisms.

Other financial strips were conjoint, such as the Bangladesh-China-India-Malaysia the Great Mekong, and the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation Economic Corridor. The premeditated financial strip's unique physiognomies comprise the next contribution in the strip of the world's two major republics, Russia, and China; the transportation character of Mongolia; and an enormous distance of one country's land, Russia. The financial strip's huge gage needs the being of an exact problematic of organization of doings between Russia's central and regional governments and China. (Dondokov, Z. B. D. 2018).




China-Indochina Peninsula Corridor

The financial strip of the China-Indochina Peninsula (CPEC) is a financial strip that was presented in 2010 and later combined into the Belt and Road Initiative. It was before recognized as the Economic Corridor of Nanning-Singapore. The China-Indochina Peninsula financial strip is one of the six main financial regions being industrialized together by China and the B&R republics. The trans-Asian railway comprised Yunnan Kunming and Guangxi Nanning to Vietnam, Hanoi, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore via the China Indochina continental bridge and Chinese cooperation with the ASEAN transnational economic corridor. Vientiane, Hanoi, Phnom Penh, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore were selected as investigation substances since they are significant protuberance metropolises lengthways the China-Indochina Peninsula's financial strip. Singapore is an advanced city-state.

Other cities are located in developing countries. The cities listed above serve as the political, economic, and cultural epicenters of their respective countries. These cities have an excellent geographical location, abundant natural resources, and massive economic development potential. These are the main points of contact for China's trade cooperation in Southeast Asia. Nanning, Guangxi, and Kunming are part of the China projects. The route, which begins in Yunnan and ends in Singapore, crosses through the Indochina 

Although an economic corridor has been agreed to be established, problems are awaiting solutions. In particular, by providing integrated coordination, the activities of the three sides need to be coordinated, and the legal environment and institutional regulations need to be created. The rail capacity is also different, and the introduction of new technologies is very slow. The newly discovered natural resources and deposits need to be connected to the existing central rail networks.

Mongolia, China, and Russia need to discuss and resolve the railway tariff and other related issues. At the Mongolian-Chinese-Russian tripartite rail transport consultation meeting held in Ulaanbaatar in April 2015, the parties agreed to increase rail freight and to conduct feasibility studies to establish a joint Mongolian-Russian-Chinese rail transport and logistics company and to increase the capacity of the' Ulan Ude-Naushki-Sukhbaatar-Zemin Uud. Also, at the leaders' meeting in Ufa, Russia, the three parties highlighted several issues, such as: launching a Mongolian, Russian and Chinese economic cooperation program to build corridors that will integrate the initiatives of the "The Russian Federation offered the "Eurasian Economic Union," proposed by Mongolia; studying financial and technical cooperation in the "Ulaanbaatar railway modernization" project; and supporting investment in infrastructure projects. Researchers have also been expressing their views after the three parties agreed to cooperate on infrastructure. Li Xin, a researcher at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, for instance, suggests that the most significant route is Chita-Manzhouli-Harbin-Suifenhe- Vladivostok among the Chinese, Mongolian, Russian economic corridors, and this route will connect to the Trans-Siberian Railway. This is the main route that will connect the province of Heilongjiang to Europe.

China Railway Company and Russian Railways, and cargo trains are previously on the China-Russia-Europe way. The second route is Chita– Ulaanbaatar–Choibalsan– Khoot–Bichigt–ZuunKhatavch (Dong Ujimqin)– Changchun–Jilin– Hunchun–Zarubino, which will connect the six Northeast Asian countries. The third route is Chita–Ulaanbaatar–Erlian (Erenhot)– Beijing–Tianjin, which needs improvement. Among the economic corridors, the first route from Ulaanbaatar via Erlian (Erenhot) to Tianjin is about 1,963 km long, while the second route, which is through Choibalsan, Dornod Province, to Jinzhou port is 1,100 km long and the shortest route.

As mentioned earlier, the other route is the new railway infrastructure that links the Tavan Tolgoi deposit with the railway networks. Mongolian Railway Company Chairman L. Purevbaatar said that a 620-km railway connecting to the Ereentsav–Choibalsan–Khoot–Bichigt route will be built and this route will become the main transit route of the Russian–Mongolian–Chinese railroad. Gantsmod (Gang Mod) border port of entry is just 235 km away from the Chinese main railway network and the distance from there to the Port of Tianjin is around 1,400 km and to the Port of Qinhuangdao 1,655 km. The distance from TavanTolgoi to Gantsmod entry port is around 270 km. Thus, this route is about 1,000 km shorter than the Bichigt–Nomrog route.

Another option is to build a 456-km railway from TavanTolgoi to Sainshand. Then it will be possible to travel by the route Sainshand–ZamynUud–Jining/330 km/– Qinhuangdao/1,300 km/–Tianjin/700 km. The Choibalsan-Khoot-Bichigt route will become the three countries' primary international railway. It is in the interest of Mongolia that Mongolia should make the most of its existing railways to save money on the investment. In the growth of the financial strips amid the three nations. Cooperation between the three countries on infrastructure requires a range of investments. It is possible to receive funding from the AIIB, the Silk Road Fund, the SCO Development Bank, the BRICS Bank, other foreign financial institutions, and the private sector.

The AIIB will fund specific infrastructure projects in particular. Wei Jianguo, Deputy Director of the Center for China International Economic Relations, said the "One Belt, One Road"

The initiative would actively encourage private sector participation and use public-private partnerships in general, there are several ways to expand in the developed sector and concessional contracts are typically used in practice. Because of the lack of funds from the Mongolian railway industry, the Mongolian government has approved the construction of some sections of the railway lines by the private sector and others under concessional contracts. If it is considered that the first and second stages of new railway construction in Mongolia would cost at least US$2 million per kilometer, then the total investment would equal US$5 billion. 

According to the railway policy adopted by the Mongolian Parliament, more than 51% of the new railway's basic infrastructure must be under government ownership.

Also, it would be risky to allow 100% private ownership in the basic infrastructure of the railway, as a railway built by one company's funding may be inaccessible to other companies or charge more. The railway gauge discrepancies between Mongolia, China, and Russia present another barrier in the construction of the economic corridor infrastructure. Because the Russian railway gauge is 1,520 mm and the Chinese gauge is 1,435 mm, transshipment is unavoidable at the China-Mongolia and Russia-European borders.

According to an agreement of the Organization for Cooperation between Railways, if transshipment is needed, the recipient site must be responsible for it. The current cost of transshipment is a uniform rate of 10 Swiss francs or US$3–5. Additionally, in consideration of the environmental pollution caused during the transshipment of coal and the loss of time, the new railway track gauge for TavanTolgoi–Gashuunsukhait and Khoot–Bichigt was agreed to be 1,435 mm, according to the Mongolian Parliament's Rail Transport Policy. Currently, for cooperation among Russia, China, and Mongolia in particular, the China–Russia, and China– Mongolia trade structures cannot be changed in the short term. Bilateral trade between Mongolia and China and Russia and China still has an "exchange of raw materials for end products" pattern. Therefore, there needs to be an increase in investment into developing the manufacturing sector and improving trade structures. Moreover, differences in the economic development of the three countries are another challenge to cooperation. 

Mongolia and Russia are competitors in terms of mining-related exports to China. Russia is active in equipment, agricultural products, and meat and milk products to diversify its export structure. As a result, it is necessary to evaluate the details of the three nations' economic development and trade structure to identify mutually beneficial cooperation that serves all parties' interests (B. Otgonsuren 2015).

Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridors

The BCIM Regional Cooperation Project Forum was initially established in 1999 and named Kunming Initiative. As part of the project, it was established, connecting areas widening from noncoastal parts, as well as the adjacent smallest industrialized republics (LDCs), Bangladesh, Myanmar, and India's northeast region. The BCIM was founded on the assumption that the Project was focused.

In the establishment of industrial zones, there would be a double benefit. To begin with, it will aid in the industrial shift by strengthening industries such as production, manufacturing, and trade logistics. Second, as China's labor costs rise, labor-intensive industries like textiles and agro-processing will be pushed out of the country. Relocating these industries to other places with reduced labor costs would be critical. Due to increased trade and connection with China and the rest of Asia, businesses operating in China are anticipated to prioritize the trade corridor area due to its existing infrastructure, enhanced logistics, and ease of access to India's isolated eastern and north-eastern states (Islam, et al., 2015).

Bangladesh is a service exporter as well as a low-cost manufacturer. In addition, the region has abundant conventional and renewable energy resources. The trade within BCIM member nations accounts for only 5% of total BCIM trade. Political issues within the region may be one of the details for the little level of skill.

For decades, geopolitical tensions have hampered not only trade links but also regional economic progress. The network is threatened, for example, by the conflict between the borders. The ancient radical tensions between Pakistan and India, which began with the establishment of the state of Pakistan in 1947, have brought the region of South Asia to a standstill. Karim et al (2018), provide a succinct comparison of the trend between the pre-nuclear and nuclear periods of the Indo-Pakistan crisis in the BCIM Economic Corridor shows that in the pre-nuclear period, interstate crises have steadily decreased. However, the frequency of crises has risen during the nuclear period. Due to the planned link between the BCIM-CPEC, the BCIM project was also postponed. The Sino-Pakistan CPEC agreement suggested the connection of the BCIM via Pakistan's occupied Kashmir. Even relations between China and India in South Asia are strained. The Chittagong Port in Bangladesh has the potential to become a hub for development and connectivity.

The Bay of Bengal (BoB) is an essential geographical site in South Asia. In recognition of Cox's Bazaar's strategic location, Japan has collaborated with Bangladesh to develop the BoB Industrial Growth Belt (Big-B) program, which aims to boost Cox's Bazaar's industrial growth.

Chittagong and Dhaka are two cities in South Asia that will have an impact on the local corporate sector. China is attempting to attach with South Asia via road, rail, and sea. It has already established ties with Myanmar, allowing it to move its focus to Bangladesh. However, the latest communal violence in Myanmar involving Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims is complicating geopolitics between Bangladesh and Myanmar. An unprecedented refugee crisis and human trafficking have been established. In addition, China aims to link up with Chittagong or other ports along the coast of Bangladesh in the Bay of Bengal. Yet, because of elevated geopolitics, things have changed considerably. India would believe it is enclosed in its eastern flank once it is already enclosed in its western flank. (Karim, 2018).




China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridors

One main large-scale Belt and Road Initiative project is the BRI. In a network of highways, ports, high-speed railways, power lines, pipelines, and other infrastructure, the Economic Corridor links China and Europe to increase stability, cooperation, and mutual benefits for developing countries in between. (Fallon, 2015)

The economic corridor between China and Central Asia and West Asia, which includes Central Asia, West Asia, and North Africa, spans westward from northwestern China via Central Asia to the Persian Gulf, Arabian Peninsula, and Mediterranean coast. Although China has become the Middle East Gulf countries' largest oil export market, West Asia, particularly the Middle East Gulf countries, has become China's most important supplier of oil and gas. Infrastructure connectivity provides China, Central Asia, and West Asia with new potential to improve infrastructure and facilitate trade as part of the China economic corridors. China has long been a major exporter of energy and services to Central and West Asia, as well as a major supplier of industrial goods such as textiles, machinery, electronics, steel, fine chemicals, and precision machinery. 

The building of these initiatives, as well as investing in rail, which has the potential to transform Central Asia's economies, which now have little trade linkages. A reasonably simple starting point to access the remainder of the network. Tehran is connected with the rest of the corridor network of Asia-Western Asian cities. Note the slightly different location of Urumqi in this network compared to its place in the Current Eurasian Land Bridge Corridor. It again has a high centrality of between (3rd) in this network, but this time it does not have a high centrality of  closeness (not in the top 10) because it needs a relatively large number of links to meet the rest of the cities in this corridor.

Development of connectivity with cities along this corridor. Large-scale projects, such as railway and highway construction, usually result in a significant shift in land use and land cover (LULCC). BRI's primary large-scale initiative, the CCAWAEC, spans a region with a population of over 1.6 billion people. Even though various studies have been completed on the Economic Corridor's strategy and economic potential, no research has been conducted to examine LULCC mapping studies in this subject. This report offers a thorough overview of the recent progress in research and addresses the problems in the study field of LULCC monitoring and driving factors publications, as well as book chapters, were examined using 17 criteria, including the main driving variables of LULCC, data gathering methodologies. (1) In the study area, fast development, development, populace development, and weather alteration have been defined; (2) LULCC has caused many environmental problems, both directly and indirectly, such as loss of biodiversity, and (3) in most parts of the study area. Finally, many recommendations were made to remedy the concerns that had been found.

The economic corridor of Central and West Asia has a multitude of problems faced by various factors. Central Asia and West Asia are resource-rich, but many factors — especially backward infrastructure and lack of funds — hamper local growth. The CCWAEC will promote economic and commercial collaboration and capital flows to these regions and will improve local economic and social growth.

Conclusion

In this article, we critically explained the role of economic corridors in Asia and how it could help China's rise in Asia. This study finds that each corridor has its own dynamics. The success or failure of any project or corridor depends on how two parties react to each other's interests and sensitivities in the region. It is also a well-known fact that Belt and Road project of China has a protentional to connect three biggest regions in the world-Asia, Africa, and Europe. As China is planning to boost its business with the rest of the world by constructing or establishing railway lines or network of roads, therefore presently it is expected that the present plan of China by connecting it with the rest of the world through such networks will give a boost not only the economy of China but will also be a game-changer for the rest of the world.

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