Pakistan’s Politics of Alliances and the Role of Pakistani Military in Politics (1954-1958): Uneven and Combined Development


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Abstract

The states have to adjust to the pressure exerted by the ‘international’; yet impact of the ‘international’ on national politics has been ignored by mainstream international relations theories. This study uses a framework of “Uneven and Combined Development” to investigate the impact of Pakistan’s inclusion in the United States led defense pacts on Pakistan military’s role in domestic politics from 1954 to 1958. The central finding of this research is that the United States preferred Pakistan military over political leadership in Pakistan to checkmate communism in Asia as well as to stop communist political parties gaining power in Pakistan. By participating in these international pacts, the role of Pakistan military expanded in politics which culminated in the first martial law (1958).

Key Words: International Politics, Domestic Politics, Uneven and Combined Development, Neo-realism, Alliances

Introduction

There is an extensive amount of research on the expansion of the role of Pakistan military in politics in the first decade after independence of Pakistan. However, most research is focused on the domestic causes, and therefore there is a dearth of literature on the role of international factors in the expanded engagement of the military in Pakistan politics from 1954-1958. Theoretically, there is no study from an international relations perspective that comprehensively analyzes the impact of the ‘international’ on national politics of Pakistan in the first decade after establishment of Pakistan. This research is an endeavor to fill the gap as it investigates the role of the ‘international’ (US led alliances) on national politics.
(increased role of the military) by applying the theoretical framework of Uneven and Combined Development (U&CD). This study comprises five sections.

The first section problematizes the clear line of demarcation between theories of national politics and international politics in international relations (IR) discourse. Theories of domestic politics (constructivism, post-modernism, Marxism etc) apply theoretical frameworks of domestic politics to analyze IR; while doing so these theories ignore role of the ‘international’ on states’ behavior in global politics. On the other hand, neo-realism can be considered as theory of the ‘international’ that analyzes the role of the ‘international’ on states’ behavior; but it ignore domestic politics in its analysis. Uneven and Combined Development is the only sociological theory of the ‘international’ that helps to understand the complexities of ‘international’ and national domains of politics in its analysis.

In the second section, security concerns from the powerful neighboring state of India have been discussed for Pakistan. It is discussed that pre-independence rivalries had been transferred in the post-independence phase in both countries. Being fearful of military might of India, Pakistan’s political and military leadership was of the view that Pakistan would have to increase its military strength for survival of the country. Therefore, defense of the country was prioritized over all other areas of life in post-independence phase in Pakistan.

The U&CD suggests that the state have to correspond to the pressure exerted by the international. The security threats from India have been explained in the third section as the reason behind Pakistan’s entrance in the US led anti-communist alliances of South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and Baghdad Pact in 1955. These alliances were formed to contain communism in Asia; however, the primary concern of Pakistan by joining these pacts was not communism but to increase its military power against India.

The fourth section concentrates on the benefits and disadvantages of joining these pacts for Pakistan. Overall capabilities of Pakistan military, air force and navy enhanced substantially because of these pacts. In addition to this, Pakistan’s forces got valuable training from the foreign trainers. However, joining these pacts was not without cost as growing Pakistan’s military strength made India suspicious. Furthermore, Pakistan was unable to follow independent foreign policy. The Arab nationalist states were not happy of pro-America policy of the US, therefore their approach became highly anti-Pakistan. Moreover, the Soviet Union, which remained neutral towards Indo-Pak conflicts prior to Pakistan’s joining the pacts, openly supported India on international forums.

The fifth section deals with the impact of the ‘international’ on national politics in Pakistan. It has been discussed that the US had apprehension about Pakistan’s political leadership. The US administration was of the view that Pakistan’s politicians were unable to stop expansion of communism in Asia. Pakistan military leadership became very close to the US administration as all the pacts signed by Pakistan with the US were signed on the recommendations of Pakistan military.
Furthermore, the US did not want to see communist political parties coming in power in Pakistan. On the tacit support of the US, Pakistan military invoked first martial law in Pakistan in 1958.

**Uneven and Combined Development**

Kenneth Waltz laments the lack of pure international relations theories when he said that it had become very difficult for the students of global politics to cast their subject in theoretical terms (Waltz, 1979). According to Waltz, the number of IR theories like neo-Gramscianism, post-structuralism, feminism, post colonialism, traditional realism and liberalism all are not ‘international’ theories as these all theories are extended forms of the theories of domestic politics (Rosenberg, 2010). Waltz’s solution to this problem was to produce an entirely different theory of geopolitics that could explain the convolutions of the ‘international’ in which he analyzed how the international anarchical structure limits states actions. Although Waltz’s neo-realist theory of the ‘international’ was phenomenal, but he committed the same mistake which he charged the theorists of other IR theories because they excluded ‘international’ from their theories of societies (national) and Waltz left out society (national) in his theory of the ‘international’ (Rosenberg, 2016, p. 20). This has divided international relations theory mainly in two camps: theories that apply theoretical frameworks of domestic politics at international level (constructivism, liberalism, Marxism etc.) and neorealism that studied the impact the international structure on states behavior in global politics. The separation of domestic and international politics has been criticized harshly by many scholars, however, none of the critics could present a unique theory of the ‘international’ which could have explained the geopolitical and sociological phenomena in a single theory (Rosenberg, 2013).

Contemporary social theory is greatly influenced by three key thinkers: Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. Though these theorists studied societies in great detail, however none of them had analyzed the change brought by the coexistence and interactions of multiple societies. In other words these theorists ignored the change brought in national societies by the ‘international’ (Rosenberg, 2016). Leon Trotsky, the Russian Marxist revolutionary, became the first scholar who studied the impact of the ‘international’ on national societies in his famous theory which he called Uneven and Combined Development (UCD). Trotsky suggested that a socialist revolution was possible in Russia towards the start of the 20th century contrary to other scholars. Marx had predicted that domestic independent industrial class is pertinent during industrialization. Furthermore, industrialization would create same social relations where ever it would go (Marx & Engels, 1973). But this Marxian view was difficult to apply at state led industrialization in Russia at the start of the twentieth century. Speedy industrial development was happening in Czarist Russia but social structure in Russia
produced by industrialization were very different than the social relations produced in the Western Europe during their course of industrialization. The Western industrialization was marked with the rise of independent bourgeoisie, but Russian state led industrialization produced no such independent industrial class towards the start of the 20th century in Russia. Therefore, the Russian Marxists were left without a coherent worldview.

Only Trotsky solved this problem by suggesting that social development of humanity has always been multiple, uneven and interactive (Rosenberg, 2007 p. 452). The increasing power of the industrial states created a ‘whip of external necessity’ on non-industrial states that if they would not copy the mode of production of advanced states, their resources would be usurped by the powerful states (Rosenberg, 2016a, p.15; Rosenberg, 2016b, p.15). Therefore, all state may not need time that was required by the Western industrial states to embark on the journey of development. The rest of states may use ‘privilege of historic backwardness’ to move towards industrialization in less amount of time. This means that all the countries may not follow the same development path and social relations in different states will remain distinctive.

There are three primary assumptions of U&CD. At First, the world is not made of just one society but it is comprised of many societies having different levels of development. Therefore, the world is uneven as some societies are richer and stronger than the others. The second claim is that these societies exist in real time; therefore their existence is combined as they interact with each other. Barry Buzan and George Lawson applied the theoretical framework of U&CD in their works on ‘global transformation’ in which they opined that revolutions of modernity were highly uneven as these happened in specific regions_ Western Europe, Japan and the US. However, this uneven development was combined at the same time because the societies live in real time because interaction has been a constant phenomenon in human history (Buzan & Lawson, 2015). Thirdly, this interaction is primary engine of historical change and development (Rosenberg, 2016). Therefore, coexistence of multiple societies enforces developing societies to emulate the developed societies as failure to do so can imperil their existence.

Coexistence enable the developing societies to copy the modern mode of production through the “privilege of historic backwardness”. Thus, Russian revolution was possible because Russia had used the ‘privilege of historic backwardness’ and was rapidly industrializing, therefore massive state led development was enough to create class conscious among the lower classes and could steer them towards a Marxist revolution. The most interesting feature of U&CD is that it analyses both ‘international’ and national domains of politics because these two domains cannot be separated, therefore are mutually inclusive. The things that are apparently national, are in fact result of complicated interactions among societies. English is combination of the Saxon, French, Norse and Latin languages. These ingredients are not merely linguistic impacts but these
were very powerful engines of influence of the Vikings, Romans, Normans and Saxons on the British political and social history. Francis Bacon opined in 1620 that three inventions of printing press, gunpowder and magnetic compass lifted Europe out of obscurity of the middle Ages. These all three inventions had origin in China and entered Europe through communication and trade (Rosenberg, 2016).

International dimension is related to intra states’ relations as well as public conscious within national societies. The people place their society in international setting and compare rates of inflation, productivity, education, economic growth, levels of democracy and justice. Through such comparisons, the people boast or criticize their society and suggest improvements in their domestic society to emulate the other developed societies (Rosenberg, 2016). These societies are materially interdependent in a number of ways. The potential of international relations field has not been fully realized and little effort has been made for contribution of IR in other fields of social sciences. Owing to this reason, no multi-disciplinary big ideas emerged in IR unlike the other fields like History, Anthropology, Sociology and comparative literature that proved fertile in presenting important inter-disciplinary big ideas(Rosenberg, 2017). There is hot debate that whether U&CD explains the general historical development or it is only limited to the contemporary industrial age that appeared since the late 19th century. John Hobson opines that failure to apply U&CD generally at world history leads into dominance of Eurocentric world view. The U&CD has the explanatory power to describe the rise of the West that used its ‘privilege of historic backwardness’. The West assimilated the ideas, technologies and institutions of non-Western major early developers like the Islamic Arabs, India and China. Through assimilating these technologies and ideas, the West finally overtook the early Eastern developers during the 19th century(Hobson, 2011). Therefore, U&CD can prove a powerful engine that can broard the horizons of IR as a subject whose ideas can travel to other fields of social sciences. This Trotskyist intake has been applied in international discourse mainly by the efforts of Justin Rosenberg, a professor in international relations department at Sussex University. The U&CD problematizes the division between national and international politics and its unique theoretical lens enables the students of international relations theory to analyze geopolitical and sociological phenomena in a single theory. In the next section, U&CD will be used to suggest that the extension of Pakistan military in politics cannot be studied properly without looking at national as well as international domain of politics in the first decade after the independence of Pakistan.

Why Pakistan entered US led Alliances?: The Security Dilemma

Since its inception, Pakistan has been preoccupied with its survival and presumed that its territorial integrity was in jeopardy (Ziring, 1980). This post-independence Indo-Pak rivalry is inextricably related to pre-independence bitter memories of
Hindu Muslim relations. Pakistan was established on the basis of the two-nation theory which claimed that the Hindus and the Muslims in the sub-continent belonged to two entirely different nations. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, declared the Indian Muslims as a nation because they had their own distinctive civilization and culture, literature and art, architecture, values, customs, traditions, history and ambitions (Rajput, 1948). After division of the sub-continent, Pakistan was sure that India had not accepted the partition and would use every opportunity to absorb Pakistan (Brown, 1972). Therefore, Pakistan foreign policy has been shaped in defensive mold since its independence because Pakistan’s majority of borders were connected with India. Furthermore, India separated the two parts of Pakistan_ East and West Pakistan_ after its inception. (Sayeed, 1987, p. 262).

India did not seriously endeavor to drawdown Pakistan’s security concerns. India’s animosity towards Pakistan was evident from the statements of the Indian leaders. India complained that the chief claim of Pakistan, that it was home for the Muslim of the subcontinent, meant that India was primarily a Hindu country. This Pakistan’s view of India as a Hindu state made realization of a secular India very difficult. Furthermore, India stressed that Pakistan’s primary objective of foreign policy was to project itself as a power to the level of India. The Indian Ambassador in Washington declared that peace could prevail between Pakistan and India only when Pakistan had realized that it was a much smaller power than India (Sayeed, 1987, p. 263). This Indian stance about Pakistan was vehemently resisted in Pakistan. Pakistan mainstream English newspaper, Dawn, noted in an editorial that if the Christian West’s primary concern was to checkmate socialist China then key apprehension of Muslim Pakistan was the inhibition of militant Hindu India (Sayeed, 1987, p. 263).

Pakistan endeavored to consult the international bodies against the aggressive Indian behavior. But, India flaunted the resolutions of these bodies and threatened to amass its forces on border of West Pakistan in March, 1950. It was thought necessary in Pakistan that the Prime Minister should go to India and stave off the imminent Indian invasion (Suharwardy, 1957). India again concentrated its troops on borders of Pakistan in August, 1951. The leaders of Pakistan military were of the opinion that as West Pakistan was geographically very close to big powers like India, the USSR and China; therefore Pakistan had no depth where its forces would be able to move back in case of Indian lightening offensive. In addition to this, East Pakistan had hardly its own troops, therefore to defend physically separate East Pakistan was very difficult. It was pertinent that Pakistan should have advanced military and air power (Sayeed, 1987, p. 268). Pakistan could not get help from Islamic world as it was either semi-dormant or engulfed in its own domestic problems in post-World War 2 (Ziring, 1980, p.221).
Pakistan’s Politics of Alliances

The theory of Uneven and Development primarily claims that multiplicity of societies makes interaction as the unavoidable fact in global politics. The nature of societal interaction can be positive (trade) or negative (rivalries and wars). This interaction creates ‘whip of external necessity’ as the societies will have to respond to international pressure (whip of external necessity). Living in the neighborhood of India rendered Pakistan highly security conscious and it was constantly looking for some procedure to redress these security concerns because Pakistan was no match of India in terms of area, population and levels of development. India refused to hand over the assets to Pakistan that were due to Pakistan on the time of division of the subcontinent. Out of forty ordinance depots, only five small workshops were situated in territory of Pakistan. Moreover, all the five British made ordinance factories were located in Indian territory (Sayeed, 1987, p. 262). The U&CD suggests that the states do not need to complete the circle of development as through the ‘logic of historic backwardness’, the states can emulate their competitors in less amount of time. Therefore, Pakistan leaders became convinced that if they wanted to survive in presence of Indian animosity they would have to modernize their military technology that was only possible through entering in some block of a powerful state. This would help Pakistan fragile defense capability. From 1947 to 1954, Pakistan looked to the United Nations and the Commonwealth and hoped that these international bodies would deter India’s aggressive behavior against Pakistan. However, soon Pakistan became convinced that these international bodies could not change Indian aggressive behavior towards Pakistan which had amassed its forces on borders on several times.

The U&CD enforced Pakistan to seek some other option. The only option that Pakistan had was to align with the US(Khan, 1963, p. 154) because the US was looking for some reliable Asian partner in its containment program of communism. The Eisenhower, Nixon, Dulles team attached high hopes about Pakistan’s role in containment policy. The US and Pakistan signed Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in 1954. In addition to this, Pakistan signed the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) a few months later. The international organization of SEATO was envisaged to be a platform for collective security against communism formed through the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty that was signed in Manila, Philippines in September 1954. The Baghdad Pact was signed among Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey and later Iran in 1955. This Baghdad Pact was renamed as Central Treaty Organization or CENTO in 1958 (Rizvi, 2011, p. 80). Baghdad Pact or CENTO was also deemed to contain communism in entering in Middle East. These pacts were thought to contain communist gains in the South Asia(Amin, 2000, p. 44). However, it was evident from the start that Pakistan was not serious in containment of the Soviet Union (Ziring, 1980, p.269) because
Pakistan’s leaders were motivated by desire to improve defensive capacity of Pakistan through these pacts against growing economic power and military might of India (Sayeed, 1987, p.269). These defense pacts were believed necessary in providing Pakistan necessary support in anti-Indian struggle (Bajwa, 1996, p. 95).

Benefits and Disadvantages of Alliances

Through the ‘privilege of historic backwardness’ Pakistan entered in the US led alliances which greatly improved the defense capacity of Pakistan. Pakistan received the technical, military, health, commercial and educational assistance from the US. The US government dispatched thousands of Americans to Pakistan under the government or private auspices. The Americans operated as advisors in construction, educational, industrial and agricultural sectors. These American advisors played a key role in the improvement of Pakistan military establishment. Thousands of Pakistani students who would have gone to the higher education institutions in Europe, were sent to American colleges and universities (Ziring, 1989, p.94). The US sent a military survey team in 1954 that was led by Brigadier General Henry F. Myres. This team studied the needs of Pakistan’s Army, Navy and Air Force. After this team, the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (U.S.M.A.A.G) visited Pakistan to help and instruct the Pakistan defense high authorities. A massive construction program was started to improve the capabilities of Pakistan’s air, land and sea.

The U.S helped Pakistan in creation of an armored division and brigade. Similarly, Pakistan received the necessary equipment to uplift its seven infantry division. Pakistan Air Force received modern and state of art jets. An enormous program was carried out to modernize Karachi naval base and Pakistan received new equipment for construction of a new naval base at Chittagong. New ships were handed over to Pakistan Navy and overall size of Pakistan Navy was enlarged (Rizvi, 2011, p. 80). Moreover, America helped Pakistan in land reclamation, developing hydro-electric power, irrigation projects, rural development, family planning and education. Other European government and private firms followed the suit and carried massive and expensive programs for national uplift of Pakistan (Lawrence Ziring, 1980, p. 223).

Exercises and training of troops was an important part of modernization of Pakistan military. The military experts of the US, the UK, Turkey and Iran were sent to supervise these military exercises in Pakistan. Pakistan Navy participated in the combined exercises of CENTO and SEATO. Through this participation, Pakistani forces obtained latest warfare techniques. Pakistan military became confident that their striking power was improved (Rizvi, 2011, p.80). The US military assistance to Pakistan was between $1.2 to $1.5 billion from 1954 to 1965. The aid provided in terms of technical support in agricultural and other development sectors was even larger. Out of total budget of $5.5 billion during the
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Second Five Year Plan, $1.7 billion were provided by the US (Sayeed, 1987, p. 270).

However, Pakistan also had to face certain disadvantages of these pacts with the US. After signing of Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, the Indian Prime Minister repudiated the combined communique on Kashmir. Soviet Union remained neutral towards the Kashmir dispute until Pakistan’s entrance in the US pacts. But after 1955, Soviet Union vetoed every resolution on Kashmir in the Security Council in favor of India. Mr. Khrushchev declared Pakistan as member of ‘aggressive Western alliance’ and called Kashmir as ‘integral part’ of India (Sayeed, 1987, p. 271). The Arab Muslim world became hostile towards Pakistan because of its joining of the Western alliance. The Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser harshly criticized Pakistan because it was a key country in Baghdad Pact. Because of this Arab hostility, Pakistan could not get their support on issue of Kashmir (Sayeed, 1987, p. 271).

Pakistan was successful in informing the world that it had serious reservations from the military prowess of India, therefore to safeguard its national interests turn towards the US was pertinent (Lawrence Ziring, 1980, pp. 221-222). But, in return, Pakistan had to provide the US important installations which could help America in surveillance of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, this American help to Pakistan created serious resentment in India and India charged the US with neo-imperialism. India condemned the US economic and military support to Pakistan because India was of the view that Pakistan would use the American military and economic aid against India (Lawrence Ziring, 1980). The visit of the top Soviet leadership was sign of growing Indian disenchantment with the US for aligning with Pakistan in Bagdad Pact and SEATO (Burke, 1973, pp. 208-209).

Impact of International Alliances on Domestic Politics of Pakistan

There is extensive amount of research that why role of Pakistan military expended in the first decade after independence of the country. However, such researches are focused on the domestic causes like failure of the political parties to deliver according to the wishes of masses, provincialism, bigotry, parochialism, secularism versus religion on conflict. Therefore, there is dearth of study on the role of the military in politics due to “international”. Theoretically, there is no study from IR perspective that explains what was the impact of ‘international’ on national politics of Pakistan in the first decade after establishment of Pakistan as a sovereign state? This study is an endeavor to fill the gap by analyzing the role of Pakistan’s participation in US led alliance against communism on military’s role in politics in Pakistan by applying the theory of Uneven and Combined Development. After the establishment of Pakistan, the US was of the view that democratic leadership of Pakistan was unable to steer Pakistan as a state that could help the US in fight against communism in Asia. Therefore, the US tacitly
supported the increased role of the military in Pakistan that culminated in first martial law in 1958. In the following passages, it will be analyzed that why the US silently supported Pakistan military’s role in politics.

Hassan Askari Rizvi suggests that only few countries in the 20th century can be presented as having inherent problem that Pakistan have inherited (Rizvi, 2011). The most immediate problems of Pakistan were lack of trained officials, poor means of communication, fragile system of democracy, very small middle class and high heterogeneous society. Pakistan is considered as a child of Jinnah; however, this baby was not health at the time of birth (Lawrence Ziring, 1997). When Pakistan was still in the grip of administrative problems, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, died in 1948. Post-Jinnah leaders did not enjoy wider influence at national level, therefore after the demise of the Jinnah, politics in Pakistan became regionalized and localized (Sayeed, 1987). Muslim League, the party that spearheaded independence of Pakistan, failed miserably to transform from a national party into a developed political party (Ali, 1998). After the demise of the founding father, political system in Pakistan functioned on the basis of opportunism, regionalism, parochialism and factionalism (Afriadi & Jibran, 2017). Instability became the constant factor of politics in Pakistan as seven prime ministers were changed and eight cabinets were formed from 1947 to 1958 (Sayeed, 1980). Khaled Bin Sayeed suggested that Pakistani politicians had no loyalty towards any goal or any principle. Post-independence Pakistan can be considered as a Hobbesian state of nature where everyone was fighting every other in a ruthless and ceaseless struggle of power. The politicians were thinking only of themselves and their families without giving even a second thought to Pakistan (Sayeed, 1959, p. 389).

On the other hand, Pakistan military has been the most powerful institution since independence of the country which has the capacity to set change in political sphere (Rizvi, 2011, p. 11). It maintained its grip on politics through devising policy in background, intervening directly through martial laws and setting governments of the civilians in which power was concentrated in hands of the military (Rizvi, 2011). The failure of the democratic leadership in Pakistan provided legitimacy to the military in Pakistan. Even the Pakistani politicians were found of eulogizing the military. The first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, opined in 1948 that defense of Pakistan was the number one priority of the nascent state. Similarly, Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra, vowed in 1953 that Pakistan would prefer to starve than cutting the defense budget. National Assembly of Pakistan harshly criticized the decision of the government to reduce the military budget and pressurized the government to cancel the decision. Average 59.51% of entire expenditure was invested defense from 1948-1957 (Rizvi, 2011, pp, 56-58).

Shuja Nawaz suggests that Pakistan military adroitly projected itself as trusted partners of the US in fight against communism in Asia. Pakistan military’s strategy
proved successful as the US took Pakistan as an important country that could defend the Middle East against communism. Pakistan willingness to stand with the US against communism was very different to Indian approach of neutralism and sometimes even pro-Soviet (Nawaz, 2011). The US was of view that democratic leadership of Pakistan was unable to make Pakistan so strong that it could act as a defense against communism. This lead to the close cooperation between the US administration and the military leadership in Pakistan. The US paid special attention to Ayyub Khan, the military commander of Pakistan, because he was enthusiast about the modernization of the military, therefore, Ayub might prove a leader who could serve the American interests in South Asia. (Rizvi, 2011, p. 80).

The US administration engaged in first military assistance program with the establishment of Pakistan. Pakistan joined (because of efforts of the military) SEATO in 1954 and the Baghdad Pact in 1955 (Lawrence Ziring, 1980, p. 93). It was Ayub’s initiative to accept the military aid program with the US. On the other hand, the US was more than happy to have Pakistan military as their partner. General Ayub Khan was convinced as early as 1951 that Pakistan needed a ‘reliable friend’ to secure itself. Pakistan’s decision to accept military aid program of the United States and joining SEATO and CENTO or Baghdad Pact was done on behalf of Pakistan’s military (Rizvi, 2011, p. 77).

The latest technology achieved by Pakistan military from the US enabled the military to become a coercive and dominant power at national level. The US was convinced that Pakistan was unable to fight any war outside of its borders, therefore military aid was deemed necessary to enable Pakistan against any possible Soviet threat. When the political parties were functioning on the basis of parochial interests, only the military was seemed as the only institution that was free of provincial prejudices. When President Iskandar Mirza, who had military background, extended his dictatorial powers in non-democratic way, the US did not criticized his decisions. When the US ambassador in Pakistan came to know that Pakistan military was thinking of imposing a martial law in 1958, he was instructed by the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that he should convey that US preferred democratic government; however, ‘exceptions could be justified’(Nawaz, 2011). According to another report Ayub Khan, the military chief of Pakistan, went to the US prior to declaring Martial Law. After getting the ‘green signal’ from the US, Pakistan military invoked first Martial Law in Pakistan on October 7, 1958 (historypak, 2012). Lawrence Ziring also gave the similar views that when Ayub Khan monopolized the power through a coup de tat in 1958, he had tacit support of the US because the US was not ‘very upset’ of his decision (Ziring, 1980). He goes on further and tells that the American advisors became more involved in Pakistan material and financial resources after Ayub’s coup in 1958 (Lawrence Ziring, 1980).

Lawrence Ziring opines that domestic and international parts of politics are interwoven in such a way that these both cannot be separated because historically
all the governments have been ‘prisoners of global international events’. He suggested that every educated Pakistani could easily understand that the military’s coup in Pakistan was invoked on the behalf of the US. He goes on further and says that declaration of martial law was just a ‘shield’ to destroy the whole edifice of democratic set up in Pakistan. The destruction of democratic government in Pakistan was pertinent from the US point of view because leftists political parties in Pakistan like the Awami League, National Awami Party, the Ganatantri Dal, Krishak Samiti and the Youth League had become too powerful (Lawrence Ziring, 1971, pp. 45-46). If these communist political parties would have been reached to political power, this would become a nightmare for the US. The political parties in Pakistan claimed that the US was the real power behind Ayub. Furthermore, they opined that the US instigated Pakistan military to intervene and usurp political leadership because the US was feared that Pakistani politicians were tilted to the left (Ali, 1970, p. 87-88). Ayub Khan promised that after the improvement in situation, the constitutional politics would be revived soon. But, this heavy American involvement in Pakistan’s domestic sphere postponed return to constitutional government (Lawrence Ziring, 1980, p. 94). Therefore, it can be seen that the expansion of Pakistan military in politics cannot be studied properly without analyzing the US help to Pakistan military.

Conclusions

This study problematizes the distinction between national and international domains of politics. This research suggest that external relations of Pakistan were formed on the basis of geo-strategic compulsions in post-independence period. Acquiring bulwark against the ‘arch-enemy’ (India) became the primary contour of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Through ‘privilege of historic backwardness’ Pakistan tilted towards the Western block and received membership of defense alliances under the US patronage. These alliances significantly improved the defense capabilities of Pakistan military. Pakistan political parties could not impress the US as the US sought a Pakistan which could prove a key US ally in checkmating the Soviets in Asia. Pakistan military became the number one choice for the US to steer Pakistan in a direction that the US wanted. After entering in the alliances, role of the political parties shrank in Pakistan’s politics, while of the military increased which culminated in first martial law in 1958. This research suggests that the US backed the decision of Pakistan military to impose martial law. This whole research had been conducted in theoretical framework of Uneven and Combined Development (U&CD). The tacit support of the US has been presented here as the ‘international’ and its impact on the emboldened role of Pakistan military has been discussed as ‘national’ factors.
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